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Large research collaborations constitute an increasingly prevalent form of social 
organization of research activity in many scientific fields. In the last decades, the concept 
of distributed cognition has provided a suitable basis for thinking about collective 
knowledge in the philosophy of science. Karin Knorr-Cetina’s and Ronald Giere’s analyses 
of high energy physics experiments are the most prominent examples. Although they both 
conceive the processes of knowledge production in these experiments in terms of 
distributed cognition, their accounts regarding the epistemic subject of knowledge thus 
produced are quite different. While Knorr-Cetina argues for an irreducibly collective 
subject, Giere argues for eliminating the epistemic subject and opting for using the passive 
voice in describing collectively produced knowledge. Neither of these views are easy to 
assimilate within an epistemological account, since epistemology traditionally operates 
within an individualist framework. They both entail that we should deny knowledge to 
individuals when the processes of knowledge production are distributed. I will argue that 
epistemology should be extended in a way that can accommodate collectively produced 
knowledge, but that we would have a serious problem if we deny scientific knowledge to 
individuals. If the members of a large collaboration cannot be said to know, we have to 
accept the absurd conclusion that either no one or only a supra-individual entity learns 
from the most successful research collaborations we have. I will argue instead for 
conceiving research collaborations in terms of a cognitive system that produces (not 
possesses) knowledge, which can eventually be possessed (though not produced) by 
constituent individuals when certain conditions are met. Firstly, the distributed research 
process should be reliable in producing scientific evidence and secondly, there should be a 
reliable distributed process of criticism for scrutinizing the reliability of the scientific 
evidence that is collectively produced. I will analyze both conditions in terms of 
distributed first-order and second-order justification, where I put forward a reliabilist 
account of justification that is compatible with epistemic dependence. I will conclude that 
the notion of justified epistemic dependence enables us to attribute knowledge to 
individuals when knowledge production is irreducibly social. 
1. Distributed cognition model of collaborative research 
Scientific inquiry is at bottom a highly structured cognitive process. Cognitive processes 
are generally though to occur exclusively within organismic boundaries, so as a cognitive 
process scientific inquiry is intuitively something that happens in the head of the 
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individual scientist. But we rarely find that such a complex form of cognition as scientific 
inquiry is realized without substantial reliance on scientific instruments and other experts, 
past and present. Various kinds of factors external to the individual agent seem to play not 
only supportive but constitutive roles in the production of scientific knowledge. Such 
epistemic dependence comes into full relief in large research collaborations, where 
individual agents coordinate their diverse expertise, cognitive effort and interactions with 
various epistemic artifacts in ways that give rise to what we may call complex cognitive 
systems. Research collaborations are formed to realize highly complex cognitive tasks, or 
“big questions,” that typically surpass the bounds of individual expertise and cognitive 
capacity, thus can be said to produce knowledge at the supra-individual or epistemic 
system level. 
 The concept of distributed cognition, which originated in cognitive science, is 
grounded in the non-individualist or externalist premise that cognition is not necessarily 
an intracranial process but can extend to external epistemic sources such as scientific 
instruments as well as incorporate the cognitive activities of multiple agents (Hutchins, 
1995; see also “extended cognition,” Clark, 1996; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Distributed 
cognition provides a useful framework for analyzing collective knowledge production in 
terms of division of cognitive labor, and it has already been employed in the philosophy of 
science to describe collaborative research processes in certain fields. On the basis of his 
observations at the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility, Ronald Giere (2002a) describes 
the collaborative research activity thus: 
In thinking about this facility, one might be tempted to ask, who is gathering the 
data? From the standpoint of distributed cognition, that is a poorly framed 
question. A better description of the situation is to say that the data is being 
gathered by a complex cognitive system consisting of the accelerator, detectors, 
computers and all the people actively working on the experiment. Understanding 
such a complex cognitive system requires more than just enumerating the 
components. It requires also understanding the organization of the components. 
And […] this includes the social organization. 
Giere (2002b) also provides a more general description of distributed cognition (which he 
does not intend as a definition): We speak of distributed cognition where two or more 
individuals reach a cognitive outcome by combining un-shared individual knowledge and 
by interacting with epistemic artifacts. Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999) similarly depicts the 
High Energy Physics experiments she observed during her field research stay at CERN in 
terms of distributed cognition: 
The point is that no single individual or small group of individuals can, by 
themselves, produce the kind of results these experiments are after ̶ for example, 
vector bosons or the long “elusive” top quark or the Higgs mechanism. It is this 
impossibility which the authorship conventions of experimental HEP exhibit. They 
signify that the individual has been turned into an element of a much larger unit 
that functions as a collective epistemic subject (p. 167-8). 
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...reflexivity is turned into an instrument of knowledge, machines are redefined and 
recruited into the social world, and the subjectivity of participants is put on the line 
– and quite successfully replaced by something like distributed cognition (p. 25). 
 
 While presenting a very useful model for examining the epistemic structure of 
collaborative science, distributed cognition raises serious doubts about whether we can 
still conceive scientific knowledge as a state of the traditional subject of epistemology—the 
individual. 
2. The subject of knowledge in research collaborations 
While Giere and Knorr-Cetina offer similar descriptions of how knowledge is produced in 
collaborative experiments in terms of distributed cognition, their accounts differ 
significantly when it comes to identifying the epistemic subject of collectively produced 
knowledge. 
 For Knorr-Cetina, the epistemic subject in the case of HEP experiments is the 
experiment itself. The whole collaboration, together with the instruments it employs and 
all the communicative and practical activities and interactions that weave the people and 
the instruments into a unitary entity, presents a novel epistemic subject: 
The HEP experiments studied, in continually integrating over themselves (to put it 
in mathematical terms), continually assemble the collaboration into a community 
reflexively bound together through self-knowledge. The medium that brings this 
assemblage about is the conversation a collaboration holds with itself. This 
conversation, I maintain, replaces the individual epistemic subject, which is so 
prominent in other fields. It construes, and accounts for, a new kind of epistemic 
subject, a procurer of knowledge that is collective and dispersed. No individual 
knows it all, but within the experiment's conversation with itself, knowledge is 
produced (Op. Cit., p. 178). 
 
For Knorr-Cetina the subjectivity of the individual subject is erased, and through 
distributed cognition the experiment not only becomes a supra-individual entity (e.g., a 
system) but an epistemic subject tout court, as it acquires “a stream of (collective) self-
knowledge” (p. 171-173), “a sort of consciousness” (p. 178).2 
 Giere (2002b, 2007), on the other hand, finds such an ascription of collective 
subjectivity to research collaborations too much of an ontological commitment.3 He argues 
that we can view certain research collaborations as distributed “cognitive systems” 
because they realize a cognitive task, not because they exhibit as a whole cognitive 
properties that imply agency. Thus, we do not need to postulate distributed cognitive 
agents in order to speak about distributed cognitive systems. In particular we do not need 
to endow such systems with mental states such as knowledge or (its prerequisite) belief. 
 
2In her portrayal even the instruments become organismic entities by virtue of the way in which researchers interact 
with them, and are integrated into an organismic whole that is the experiment – which she models along the lines of 
Durkheimian collective consciousness. The above quoted paragraph continues: “For those who still remember 
Durkheim (1933: chap. 3), the conversation produces a version of his much-rebuffed ‘conscience collective’.” 
3Kitcher (1994) and Thagard (1997) similarly argue against the view that knowledge can possessed by a collective 
subject. 
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He maintains, instead, that we should characterise them in a depersonalized or impersonal 
way, “so that we would say things like ‘This experiment has shown that. . . .’ or ‘This 
experiment leads to the conclusion that. . . .’” He envisions that the developing science of 
cognition could allow us to redefine cognition as a technical rather than folk-psychological 
term, and to leave behind the assumption that “if knowledge is being produced, there 
must be an epistemic subject, the thing that knows what comes to be known” (2007, p. 
316). 
3. Why both no-subject and the collective-subject accounts of scientific knowledge are 
problematic 
Both the strategy of conceiving collective knowledge in a non-subjective or impersonal 
way and that of postulating collective epistemic subjects conflict with the individualistic 
perspective of traditional epistemology, according to which knowledge is a 
cognitive/epistemic state of the individual. Distributed cognition provides us with a 
framework in which we can reconsider this core individualistic assumption and talk about 
distributed or collective knowledge, as it is increasingly being done in social epistemology. 
I maintain, however, that this extension or revision of traditional epistemology (cf. 
Palermos and Pritchard, 2013) should not go as far as postulating distributed or collective 
epistemic subjects or endorsing an exclusively impersonal view of knowledge in case of 
distributed cognition. Both these strategies are problematic, and collective production of 
scientific knowledge does not present us with a forced choice between these two. 
3.1. Irreducibly collective knowledge 
The collective-subject account is problematic primarily due to the unnecessarily high 
degree of ontological commitment it has to make. Firstly, research collaborations do not 
seem prima faciae to manifest subjective properties such as consciousness, reflectivity, care 
or self-knowledge. Knorr-Cetina attributes the HEP experiments precisely such subjective 
properties, but does so without putting forward an explicit ontological argument that 
would warrant such an attribution. In order to warrant the postulation of collective 
subjects, one has to demonstrate that collective accomplishment of a cognitive task entails 
a collective mind. To put this in terms of distributed cognition, one has to show at least 
how distributed cognition implies distributed mental states. Such an account has to go 
beyond joint actions and argue for irreducibly collective subjective properties.4 
 For justification of such an inference from distributed cognition to irreducibly 
collective (or social) epistemic subjects, we can turn to other accounts that similarly 
advocate high-commitment positions. More recently Alexander Bird (2014) and Orestis  
Palermos (2020) argued for genuinely or irreducibly collective scientific knowledge. Bird, 
 
4There are other accounts of collective epistemic states which do not make the ontological commitment in the 
second step, such as the joint commitment or acceptance accounts of group belief by Raimo Tuomela (1992, 2004) 
and Margaret Gilbert (1987, 2004). These and similar accounts can possibly suffice in explaining collective 
knowledge in terms of joint acceptance of propositions or systems of propositions on the basis of collectively 
acquired or shared evidence, without recourse to collective mental/subjective states. A detailed analysis of the joint 
acceptance accounts of collective belief or knowledge go beyond the narrow scope of the present paper. 
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like Knorr-Cetina, invokes Durkheim’s concept of “organic solidarity” in grounding 
distributed cognitive systems as genuine epistemic subjects. Scientists in a research 
collaboration, for Bird, compose a genuine social entity on the basis of their mutual 
interdependence due to the division of scientific labor, which implies a distribution of 
cognitive sub-tasks not merely in a quantitative but also qualitative manner (i.e., in 
accordance with the heterogeneity of the expertise required). He then goes from division 
of scientific labor to irreducibly collective epistemic states via a functionalist argument: 
The collective entity realizes a cognitive function, which consists in cognitive activity 
geared towards a certain goal, and we can explain a cognitive function the best by 
attributing intentional states to the target system. The system as a whole can be said to 
have a cognitive/epistemic state on the basis of accomplishing a cognitive function even if 
no individual member of the system is in that a state. Thus, there can be scientific 
knowledge (of the group) without any individual knowing. Bird does not even restrict this 
account to distributed cognitive systems with clearly defined tasks, but extends to wider 
science on the basis of epistemic interdependence of the scientific community, calling it a 
single entity. 
 A core concern here is obviously that Bird’s account is actually not able to 
differentiate between unified cognitive systems and loosely organized epistemic 
communities, and the framework of distributed cognition loses its conceptual role in 
accounting for collective knowledge. Epistemic interdependence in the broad sense can be 
said to characterize all human epistemic endeavors and we can clearly not speak of an 
epistemic subject who is absolutely autonomous in producing knowledge. In this regard, 
he is not in a position even to delineate an actively interacting epistemic community from 
its long past contributors, since findings, theories and inventions live much longer than 
their originators. This directly leads to the worry that the subject of scientific knowledge is 
inflated to the point of meaninglessness.5 
 Palermos (2020) offers a similarly strong definition of distributed cognitive systems, 
which nonetheless delineates distributed cognitive systems from broader communities of 
knowledge. His account draws on Dynamic Systems Theory and can be summarized as 
follows: 
Emergent dynamic system view of distributed cognition: There is a distributed 
cognitive system if and only if continuous and reciprocal interactions between 
constituent members give rise to an integrated system with novel, non-aggregative 
properties. 
For Palermos, collective knowledge that arises in such a distributed cognitive system is a 
special kind of group knowledge, one that is not summative. Palermos argues for the 
further conclusion that the emergent system is an irreducible group entity, which can also 
 
5A similar objection directed at the extended (or distributed) cognition thesis is known as the “cognitive bloat” (see 
e.g., Rupert, 2004). I am not concerned with this argument in this paper, since I assume that distributed cognitive 
systems can be meaningfully individuated although I argue against attributing them subjective or agentive states. 
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be seen as a group mind.6 The reason is that emergent distributed cognitive systems 
exhibit, for Palermos, socio-cognitive properties that do not belong to any individual 
member (2016b).7 Palermos’ account is clearly free from the the kind of inflation of the 
epistemic subject, since his criterion of inclusion is continuous and reciprocal interaction. 
This criterion, for Palermos, applies to distributed cognitive systems in the same way it 
does to individual (biological) cognitive systems. Individual cognitive systems are 
characterised by cooperative interactions between the (functionally parsed) constituent 
parts and sub-parts of the system (e.g., memory, motor control). Distributed cognitive 
systems are organized through the coupling of multiple cognitive systems through 
continuous and reciprocal interactions and by virtue of functional equivalence they also 
deserve the status of cognitive systems. Further, in case distributed systems can 
accomplish the same cognitive functions as biological systems, such as decision-making or 
belief-formation, the resulting cognitive/epistemic states are those of the system as a 
whole not in an aggregative or summative but irreducible sense, even if no constituent 
member manifests them. 
 Besides the costly ontological commitment to collective epistemic subjects, these 
and similar accounts explicitly acknowledge the probability of a scenario where we can 
rightly attribute knowledge of a scientific discovery to literally no scientist. This 
undesirable conclusion, I think, rests partly on a conflation of collective processes and 
their properties with the outcomes of such processes. Sometimes a task consists merely in 
a “performance,” but in many other cases there is an output distinct from the performance 
that brought it about. Let us think of Hutchins’s example of ship navigation, through 
which he greatly popularized the concept of distributed cognitive system.8 A typical task 
on a ship can be bringing the ship to a dry dock, the outcome of which is only that the ship 
has been dry-docked. It is accomplished by a system, where instruments and people co-
constitute a vast network of mutual computational and representational dependencies, as 
Hutchins describes. The task is massively distributed, such that we can point to no one 
who indeed docks the ship. A sub-task such as determining the relative position of the 
ship vis-a-vis the dock, however, has a specific output: the calculated relative position of 
the ship. While the task of determining it is a genuinely collective cognitive effort, the 
position of the ship can be known in principle by anyone. In this regard, collaborations 
ultimately produce scientific propositions, and I doubt that it is an appealing conclusion to 
say that some scientific propositions are not known by anyone but a supra-individual 
entity. 
 Palermos’ argument in particular proceeds from collective performances to 
emergent collective properties, such as epistemic responsibility. I think one can 
convincingly argue that distributed cognitive systems have weakly emergent collective 
 
6See also “extended mind.” 
7Against the possible objection that the atrribution of a mind implies attribution of consciousness, which groups 
lack, Palermos (2016b) states that consciousness may not be necessary for mindedness. In particular, he considers it 
plausible that groups manifest specific cognitive processes such as memory, decision-making and knowing. See n.1. 
8I have to note that Hutchins himself is more symphatetic to the idea of a distributed mind than I am. 
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properties. In the case of research collaborations, the required “expertise” for 
implementing the collectively agreed research design, data collection and analysis 
methods, manipulation and coordination of instruments and so on is a property of the 
system as a whole, as well as properties such as the “reliability” and “efficiency” of the 
research process in yielding credible empirical evidence. Such weakly emergent properties 
could be among the determinants of whether accepting a scientific proposition counts as 
knowledge. However, it is not clear what would be gained by attributing strongly 
emergent subjective/agentive properties such as collective intentionality, consciousness, 
motivations or beliefs to research collaborations. The distributed research process realized 
by a collaboration is primarily one of establishing scientific evidence for a proposition by 
implementing a methodological plan; it is not a process of belief-formation. The epistemic 
status of the scientists’ belief in the scientific proposition collectively asserted by a research 
collaboration could depend on various weakly emergent properties of the distributed 
cognitive system such as expertise and reliability, as I will explicate further in the 
following sections, but we do not need to invoke collective mental states to account for 
this. 
3.2 Impersonal knowledge 
To turn to the no-subject account, we can admit that conceiving scientific knowledge as 
impersonal knowledge, or knowledge without a subject has some conceptual advantages 
and a certain appeal. Scientific knowledge, arguably unlike mundane knowledge-that and 
clearly unlike knowledge-how, is at a fundamental level a system of statements that are 
interwoven via logical operations and methodological rules. In this respect scientific 
knowledge can be regarded as “objective knowledge” in Popper’s sense (1968), in 
contradistinction to “subjective knowledge” which is a cognitive phenomenon—
specifically, a form of belief. 
 Although he does not specify what he means by impersonal knowledge beyond 
suggesting that we reformulate knowledge attribution statements in passive form, Giere’s 
impersonal knowledge can lend itself to be interpreted in a way quite similar to Popper’s 
objective knowledge (see esp. Giere, 2007). But the concept of objective knowledge does 
not tell us by itself anything about the processes of knowledge production, which establish 
the empirical justification for the targeted system of statements, or where this kind of 
knowledge resides—in individual minds, groups of minds, or in books, articles, 
databases? It merely refers to the outcome of an epistemic process, which in turn can be 
regarded as mental content as well as a material system of external signs. Thus, the 
concept of objective knowledge does not imply any commitment to any epistemic subject 
either in its production or its possession. Consequently, we still have to ask the question of 
what exactly is collective in collective scientific knowledge, to which we can in principle 
give two answers: We can say that it is collectively produced knowledge or that it is 
collectively possessed knowledge (or both). The way Giere analyzes research collaborations 
through the concept of distributed cognition leads us to the first option: Research 
collaborations produce objective knowledge (e.g., a scientific finding) by realizing 
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collectively the complex cognitive processes that are required for its establishment, where 
these processes involve combining various kinds of background knowledge (i.e., 
expertise), interacting with various scientific instruments (i.e., epistemic artifacts), and 
organizing various cognitive activities into a coherent procedure (e.g., analyzing data, 
drawing inferences). 
 Collective production of knowledge (through distributed cognition) is also a feature 
of Knorr-Cetina’s, Bird’s and Palermos’ analyses. The core difference between these two 
perspectives is how they answer the question as to the epistemic subject of the knowledge 
thus produced. This question addresses, as I have said, the seat of knowledge. For Giere 
we do not need to answer this question; we do not have to assume an epistemic subject 
that knows “what comes to be known” (i.e., objective knowledge). For others, the subject 
that knows is “the experiment,” “the scientific community,” or “the collaboration:” an 
irreducibly collective subject. 
 While scientific knowledge is in one respect clearly objective knowledge, which can 
“reside” in systems of material, external signs (e.g., printed in books), it would be a far-
fetched conclusion to say that it can reside solely in this manner. Can we say that it will be 
known that the universe is expanding even if the world enters another dark age and 
nobody is left who understands theoretical physics? The no-subject account of collectively 
produced knowledge leads us, just like the collective subject account, to the absurd 
conclusion that nobody comes to know what is established in some of the most successful 
cases of scientific research, such as the empirical confirmation of the Higgs boson. I think a 
much more commonsensical position is to say that objective knowledge implies subjective 
knowledge. Tuomela (2004) also hints at such an implication by saying that “such 
knowledge is not an abstract entity floating around in some kind of Platonic ‘third world’. 
Rather it is knowledge that some actual agent or agents actually have or have had as 
contents of their appropriate mental states.”  Thus, we should be able to say that research 
collaborations produce knowledge in a distributed manner, but it is the individual 
scientists that come to know the outcomes of the distributed cognitive process. Giere 
actually has a suggestion in a similar direction, though he does not specify it in a way that 
would satisfy the epistemologist. He argues that it is the individual experts who evaluate 
the outcomes and draw conclusions on the basis of the experiments, and indirectly the lay 
person through their testimony. Although this kind of knowledge cannot be produced by 
individuals, it can be known by them (2002b, p. 643). 
 However, the traditional epistemological concept of knowledge, despite all variety 
in its analysis, is that of subjective knowledge: a mental (cognitive) phenomenon and more 
specifically a particularly valued form of belief. It is generally the qualities of the belief 
forming process that raises it to the level of knowledge, in addition to the qualities of the 
belief’s content. From a virtue reliabilist perspective, for instance, a true proposition or a 
system of true propositions is not knowledge; it is the belief in a true proposition (or a 
system thereof) that is formed via the exercise of a reliable cognitive competence. From an 
internalist perspective, it is a true belief which is supported by consciously available good 
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reasons. In any case, the processes whereby knowledge is produced cannot be divorced 
from it, as they are the source of its justification. But this is exactly what happens in 
distributed cognitive systems: The agentive constituents of the system might come to 
entertain true beliefs by accepting the outcome (if the distributed process is successful in 
yielding true propositions), but they are never sufficiently justified in doing so. The 
problem with distributed processes of scientific justification for the epistemologist stems 
thus from the fact that the traditional individualistic view of knowledge involves 
epistemic autonomy: Epistemic subjects can be said to know if they are solely or primarily 
responsible in the production of this knowledge.9 
 If we admit that objective knowledge implies subjective knowledge, the traditional 
individualism of epistemology leads us directly to a problem in the case of distributed 
cognition: we either have to postulate a collective epistemic subject who solely has the 
justification (i.e., scientific evidence) for accepting a system of propositions (i.e., a scientific 
claim), or we have to provide an account of how the individual scientist can be said to 
know without having the justification to do so (See Hardwig, 1985, p. 348-9).10 In either 
case we ironically end up going radically against the individualist premise (by denying 
either the individuality of the epistemic subject or the requirement for epistemic 
autonomy). I think exploring the second (in my opinion more conservative) option is a 
better strategy in accounting for collective knowledge. But I propose a more nuanced 
account which allows that individuals can have sufficient justification non-autonomously, 
which grounds my position that scientific knowledge that can be collectively produced 
and individually known. 
4. A third way: Collectively produced, individually known 
The most parsimonious and plausible way to save both subjective knowledge of scientific 
propositions and the premise that the proper epistemic subject is the individual goes 
through reconsidering the requirement for epistemic autonomy and updating our view of 
knowledge to accommodate epistemic dependence. We can then be in a position to 
formulate an alternative account of collective scientific knowledge by conceiving research 
collaborations as distributed cognitive systems that produce (not possess) knowledge 
(section 4.1), which can eventually be possessed (though not produced) by constituent 
individuals when certain conditions are met (section 4.2). 
4.1 Research collaborations as distributed cognitive systems for production of objective 
knowledge 
In research collaborations the “output” is not a collective mental state such as belief but a 
system of scientific propositions which stand in inferential relations to the reported data 
given the documented methodological procedures. Thus, as far as we see the product as 
 
9See also Palermos, 2016a. Palermos formulates epistemic autonomy in terms of autonomous possession of 
justification. 
10Freiman and Miller (2020)  and Palermos (2016a) call this problem “Hardwig’s dilemma.” 
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“knowledge,” it is knowledge only in the objective, non-mental sense.11 We can 
alternatively say that the distributed cognitive process is only one of evidence-generation 
in support of collectively made assertions. Either way, the outcome is not knowledge in 
the subjective sense. 
 The construal of a research collaboration as a “cognitive” system means, in line 
with Giere, that it is a socio-technological system of various activities that serve the 
fulfillment of a cognitive task. A significant portion of these activities are also cognitive in 
nature, while the rest can be primarily practical, social or instrumental. The 
implementation of a research plan through distributed cognition in research collaborations 
does not compel us beyond this to postulate distributed minds, agents or subjects, 
because, as I argued, the research process as a whole is not a mental, agentive or subjective 
activity like belief formation, but a process of knowledge production in the objective sense 
or, still more narrowly, one of evidence generation. 
4.2 Individual collaboration members as the proper subjects of knowledge 
I believe that the force of the collective-subject argument rests on the implicit intiution that 
epistemic dependence is not compatible with knowledge.12 Strong anti-individualist 
perspectives on collective knowledge, such as those of Bird and Palermos, arguably still 
conceive epistemic justification in traditional individualistic terms. They seem to assume, 
namely, that attributing a belief the status of knowledge or any other valuable epistemic 
standing requires that the processes of justification that underly or support the belief 
should be autonomous. In other words, they should be the primary target of epistemic 
credit or blame.  Since the individual scientist in a research collaboration is not primarily 
creditable with the success of the distributed research process, there should be a collective 
subject or agent who is thus creditable. Thus, epistemic dependence would lead us to 
postulate collective subjects only if we assume that knowledge requires sufficient 
justification on the basis of cognitive agency. 
 Pritchard’s (2015) formulation of positive epistemic dependence gives us a 
conception of knowledge that commits to a weaker form of anti-individualism: 
 
(Positive) Epistemic Dependence: An epistemic subject can come to know that p 
by exercising a degree of cognitive agency that is not sufficient for knowing 
that p through enabling factors that are external to the subject’s cognitive 
agency. 
 
From the perspective of a weak epistemic anti-individualism, one can be said to know in a 
way that is dependent on enabling external factors if one’s agency plays a significant, but 
not necessarily a primary role in one’s epistemic success. One formulation of weak 
epistemic anti-individualism can be found in an earlier work by Palermos (2015), where he 
 
11According to Palermos (2020), in the case of epistemic collaborations, the collective cognitive property is the 
resulting beliefs’ positive epistemic standing. But we do not have to accept that “positive epistemic standing” 
implies a collective agent, since it is not even a cognitive property. For instance a high “degree of corroboration” of 
a scientific claim can ground positive epistemic standing, although it is an objective, formal property. 
12For a similar interpretation, see Pritchard (2015). 
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argues that in certain cases knowledge can be creditable to social factors as well as to the 
individual and in Pritchard’s (2010) weak cognitive ability condition on knowledge: 
 
COGAWEAK: One knows that p only if one’s epistemic success is due to a 
significant degree to one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency. 
In the following I will go into how we can conceive knowledge-enabling external 
factors with respect to distributed cognitive systems in science. 
4.2.1 Distributed first-order justification and reliability of distributed research 
processes 
A research collaboration implements a complex research plan that requires the effective 
coordination of various research activities that are globally geared towards a unitary goal, 
such as establishing evidence in support of a scientific theory. These activities or sub-tasks 
typically require diverse expertise, simultaneous manipulation of multiple scientific 
instruments, or data collection at different times and places. Thus, the evidence towards 
the truth of a scientific proposition is established in a distributed manner. We can call the 
process whereby this evidence is established distributed first-order justification. It is 
distributed, since producing such complex scientific evidence exceeds the cognitive ability 
and capacity of individual researchers and requires a distributed cognitive system. 
 The constituent members of a research collaboration do not have this kind of 
complex first-order justification. What they typically have is partial first-order justification. 
However, they can reliably form true beliefs by accepting a scientific proposition that is 
empirically established through a distributed research process of which they implemented 
a part. The reliability of such an epistemically dependent belief-formation process refers in 
significant part to the reliability of the distributed research process, which constitutes one 
of the enabling external factors we are looking for. 
 The reliability of a distributed research process implies that the individual pieces of 
information (including data, results, other testimony) contributed by the members of the 
collaboration are true sufficiently often, and they cohere into a unified body of scientific 
evidence necessary for asserting the scientific claim put forward by the collaboration.  That 
is, on the one hand the organization of the distributed cognitive system should realize an 
efficient division of scientific labor and reliable flow of information, and on the other the 
research should manifest theoretical, methodological and experimental virtues such as 
valid inferential structure, good research design and reliable scientific-technical 
infrastructure. The former pertain to the properties of the distributed cognitive system that 
creates and implements a research plan.13 The latter are related to the properties of 
 
13It is possible to draw an analogy here to Hardwig’s (1991) analysis of trust in a testifier in terms of trust in the 
epistemic and moral character of the testifier. The epistemic character of the testifier can be replaced by the efficient 
division of scientific labor in a research collaboration, and the moral character can be replaced by successful (i.e. 
sufficiently free from error and noise) internal communication. However, instead of trust I prefer to speak of 
justification, in the reliabilist sense, since a research collaboration has to plan, implement and constantly monitor 
the performance of its epistemic and social organization. 
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objective knowledge the cognitive system is set to generate. Together these two factors 
constitute the epistemic competence of the cognitive system as a whole to produce 
epistemically valuable outputs such as true empirical propositions.  This distributed 
epistemic competence gives us the complete first-order justification for the (system of) 
scientific propositions put forward by a research collaboration. 
4.2.2 Distributed second-order justification and reliability of criticism 
Following Sosa’s (2007) twofold distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, we 
can conceive scientific knowledge (of the scientist) as a species of reflective knowledge; 
that is, a case of knowledge which not only implies that one reaches true beliefs through 
the exercise of reliable cognitive skills or dispositions (i.e., epistemic virtues), but also that 
one has a positive judgment regarding the reliability of the skills or dispositions in 
question. In other words, animal knowledge can enjoy merely first-order justification, 
while reflective knowledge requires both first-order and second-order justification. 
Generally speaking, while epistemic support for the proposition p constitutes first-order 
justification, epistemic support for the reliability of the processes whereby one’s belief that 
p is formed constitutes second-order justification. Evidence for the proper functioning of 
my visual system constitutes second-order justification for my perceptual belief that p, 
good calibration of the astronomer’s telescope gives the astronomer second-order 
justification for the accuracy of the measurements made with it, or my reasons for 
believing that A’s testimony that p is based on A’s knowledge that p constitute my second-
order justification for p. 
 In this regard, the objective reliability of the research process, namely the epistemic 
competence of the distributed cognitive system14 to produce objective knowledge, is only a 
necessary condition for acquiring subjective scientific knowledge through reliance on the 
distributed research process. A further requirement is that one can positively evaluate the 
epistemic competence of the distributed cognitive system and thereby the reliability of the 
distributed research process. This evaluation gives us second-order justification for the 
(system of) scientific propositions put forward by a research collaboration. In the scientific 
context, second-order justification concerns the assessments of reliability regarding the 
data, methods, instruments, or the track-record of other experts as informants. The whole 
body of such assessments constitute second-order justification that the resulting (system 
of) scientific propositions are the outcome of a reliable process of scientific justification. 
 A research collaboration has to aim for effective control of various sources and 
kinds of error. In a distributed cognitive system, second-order justification may also be 
distributed; namely, when the required reliability-assessments are made via a distributed 
social process, where different collaboration members realize different parts of the whole 
reliability-assessment task. This comprises a wide range from the calibration of 
instruments to comparison of independent calculations and nested review committees. A 
 
14While I extend Sosa’s notion of epistemic virtue (i.e., reliable competence) to distributed cognitive systems, I do 
not extend either of his two levels or grades of knowledge beyond the individual agentive components of the system 
(cf. Palermos, 2020). 
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distributed cognitive system can have distributed higher-order regulative mechanisms 
(based on social practices) to achieve this, which we can call the distributed social process of 
criticism. The reliability of the social process of criticism implies that the collaboration 
actively monitors sources of error and has the necessary social and technological means at 
its disposal to detect and fix errors when they are present. A reliable socially distributed 
process of criticism would be organized so as to make use of available expertise and 
resources in the most efficient and effective way, and can do so by relying on the already 
established social organization of a research collaboration. In HEP experiments the 
distributed process of criticism involves horizontally organized cross-checking and 
monitoring tasks, validation mechanisms such as sister experiments (e.g., ATLAS and 
CMS) as well as vertically organized review processes realized by nested work groups, 
panels and committees. Together with the high transparency and ongoing record-keeping 
of all aspects of the research process, the distributed process of criticism gives the 
collaboration members second-order justification to accept the findings and conclusions. 
Individual members of a collaboration do not have to scrutinize all aspects of the research 
process when this task of scientific scrutiny or criticism can be realized as a reliable 
distributed process. 
 Following Pritchard’s formulation of positive epistemic dependence, the reliability 
of the distributed social process of criticism thus gives us the other enabling external factor 
we were looking for: The reliability of the distributed research process and the reliability 
of the distributed process of criticism together determine whether the acceptance of an 
individual member of a collaboration of the scientific proposition(s) put forward by the 
collaboration (if the proposition is true) counts as knowledge. The cognitive agencies of 
collaboration members still play a significant part in the explanation of their individual 
knowledge, since they both significantly contribute to the distributed process of research 
and its criticism, and are well-informed about the reliability of the scientific justification 
for the propositions they come to accept. Thus, they also satisfy a weak cognitive ability 
condition on knowledge.   
4.2.3 Epistemically dependent knowledge 
In conclusion we can combine the two knowledge-enabling external factors under an 
account of epistemically dependent knowledge in distributed cognitive systems:   
 
Epistemically dependent knowledge: An epistemic subject A can come to know 
that p by relying on the distributed cognitive process X of which evidence for 
p is the outcome if (i) X is a reliable process for establishing the evidence that 
would be sufficient for knowing that p, and (ii) there is a reliable distributed 
process of criticism for evaluating and maintaining the reliability of X that is 
available to A. 
 
When the conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied we can minimally talk about justified epistemic 
dependence, where the individual members of a research collaboration would be justified 
for accepting the scientific proposition(s) put forward by the research collaboration. If it is 
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further the case that the scientific proposition(s) are true, we can reasonably attribute 
epistemically dependent knowledge to the individual members of a research 
collaboration.  
Both (i) and (ii) require that the social process of criticism is spatiotemporally 
connected to the research process. Complex distributed research processes require 
constant monitoring and calibration in order to be and remain reliable. The social process 
of criticism accordingly should fulfil the functions of both evaluating and maintaining the 
reliability of research, but without a spatiotemporal connection it cannot fulfil the latter. 
The requirement of availability, on the other hand, is dictated by the nature of reflective 
knowledge itself. It is a quite realistic research scenario that the reliability of a certain 
method, instrument or some other aspect of the research procedure cannot be conclusively 
assessed at the time it is conducted, but technological or theoretical developments enable a 
conclusive positive assessment at a much later date. In such cases the researchers would 
not be in a position to know their scientific conclusions, though they may have good 
reasons to accept them and pursue their research project. Both these requirements, namely 
spatiotemporal connection and availability, are fulfilled ideally by integrating the social 
process of criticism into the research process itself in the form of internal criticism.    
 Lastly, in relation to my criticism of the no-subject and collective-subject accounts of 
collective scientific knowledge which resonate in their rejection of individual subjective 
knowledge of (a system of) scientific propositions established via a distributed research 
process, I would like to reiterate my concern that this rejection leads us to an absurd or 
undesirable conclusion. Namely, if the members of a large collaboration cannot be said to 
know, even in the presence of efficient and reliable social mechanisms for scrutinizing the 
reliability of the complex body of evidence, scientists outside of the collaboration who are 
working in the same discipline, let alone other scientists and lay people, can in no way be 
said to have any adequate justification to accept the results and thus to be in a position to 
know. But this would lead to the absurd conclusion that no one learns from the most 
successful research collaborations we have. 
 Conceiving collective scientific knowledge as collectively produced objective 
knowledge allows us to accommodate truly distributed cognitive processes of scientific 
justification, and the concept of epistemically dependent knowledge allows us to retain the 
commonsensical intuition that objective knowledge implies subjective knowledge. Thus, 
collective scientific knowledge fruitfully prompts us to reconsider processes of scientific 
justification without necessarily leading to a dilemma regarding its epistemic subject. 
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